emiliano acosta employed to solve the critical points in the traditional understanding of recognition and of some of its related concepts.
Introduction
Without a doubt the concept of recognition is one of the most significant contributions of german idealism to the history of philosophy. unlike other concepts and methodological tools developed by german idealism, which also have been treated in other periods of the history of Western thought (such as the deduction of the categories or the conflict between morality and law), the question of recognition belongs originally to german idealism. indeed, german idealists have been the first philosophers who have made of this question a philosophical problem and who have conceived it as fundamental part of a philosophical system. furthermore, the concept of recognition enjoys in our present a remarkable potential to question some presuppositions in the fields of politics, morals, ethics and philosophy of right as well as to philosophically open up the phenomenon of inter-subjectivity in its own complexity. this is why recognitionunlike other concepts of german idealism, which in our days can only be a subject for a historiography of the philosophy-is present and at work in fundamental contemporary political philosophical debates such as the debate on distribution and recognition.1 nevertheless, the diversity of conceptions of recognition in german idealism remains still almost unexplored. on the one hand, in current political philosophy, for example, it is taken for granted that hegel's concept of recognition is the only one forged by german idealism or it is the only one that deserves to be examined or criticized. the first claim can be traced back to a certain lack of information or to a narrow concept of recognition. the second claim is supported by the conviction that hegel's account is the only one that has been consistently and completely developed. accordingly, other conceptions of recognition are considered as uncompleted or deficient variations of the same idea and as such they can and must, for that reason, be subsumed in hegel's account. however, a first exploration in the conceptions of recognition in the german idealism (schiller's, schelling's, fichte's and hegel's perspectives on this topic) let see that the differences between them lie in fundamental points such
